

# **Behavioral Aspects of Merger Decisions: The Effect of Reference Prices on Bidders and Targets**

by

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# **Behavioral Aspects of Merger Decisions: The Effect of Reference Prices on Bidders and Targets**

## **Abstract**

We develop a novel measure of target shareholders' average purchase price (TAPP). In a sample of all U.S. public firm merger offers from 1990 to 2019, we find that: (1) the offer premium is positively correlated with the ratio of TAPP to the target's pre-offer stock price; (2) TAPP dominates the institutional investor purchase price as an explanatory variable; and (3) the TAPP effect is additive and about equal in its magnitude to that of the pre-offer 52-week-high price. Our results indicate that reference prices affect merger deals primarily via adjusting the offer premium, and portray TAPP as a promising shareholder purchase-price indicator.

*JEL classification:* G34, G41

*Keywords:* mergers and acquisitions; reference prices; anchoring; shareholders' average purchase price.

## 1. Introduction

Mergers are common practices in the growth strategy of business companies, requiring grand and non-trivial business decisions from both bidder- and target-firm management and shareholders. Assuming there exists an economic logic behind a proposed merger (based, for example, on synergies), the question is always what share of the surplus each side of the deal reaps.

Merger negotiations make some room for bidder- and target-shareholders behavioral attitudes or points of view. Indeed, recent literature has documented that behavioral aspects affect the terms of a deal. Baker, Pan and Wurgler (2012) showed that a target firm's peak stock price in the 52 weeks preceding a merger offer (52-week high, in short) affects both offer premium- and merger-acceptance likelihood. The offer premium increases with the ratio of the 52-week high to the pre-offer target stock price, and offer-acceptance likelihood jumps when the offer price exceeds the 52-week high. Baker et al. (2012) interpreted their evidence as suggesting that the 52-week high is an important reference price for the various participants (including the "neutral" advisors and financiers) involved in the deal. For target firm shareholders, the 52-week high represents a price they could recently sell for. Thus, to mitigate any regret feelings and convince target management and shareholders to accept a merger offer, the bidder needs to adjust its offer price in accordance with the ratio of the 52-week high to the pre-offer target-stock price.

Behavioral economics also highlights the stock purchase price as a cardinal anchor or reference price. The original prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), the later disposition effect (starting with Shefrin and Statman, 1985), and the recent cognitive resonance thesis (Kaustia, 2010) all view the stock purchase price as a pertinent reference or even a reservation price.

Tests of the prospect-theory implications require estimating shareholders' representative stock purchase price—a challenging task with little progress thus far. We develop a measure of shareholders' average purchase price, based on the Proportional Trading Model commonly used by courts in securities' fraud litigation (Furbush and Smith, 1994). In a sample comprising all U.S. merger offers from 1990 to 2019 in which both bidder and target are public firms, we examine whether our estimated Target Average Purchase Price (TAPP, in short) serves as an important reference price for two key merger decisions: the bidder's decision on offer price, and the target's decision on whether to accept the merger offer.

We find that when the TAPP exceeds the target's pre-offer stock price, the bidder adjusts its offer price upwards (to partially compensate target shareholders for their loss), increasing the offer premium *ceteris paribus*. On the other hand, we find little support for the proposition that when target shareholders have paper profits (the pre-offer target price exceeds the TAPP), bidders cut their offer price, reducing the offer premium *ceteris paribus*.

The purchase price effect on mergers was previously proposed by Ye (2014), who focused on institutional investors and employed the Frazzini (2006) methodology to compute an estimate of Institutional Investors' weighted Average Purchase Price (IIAPP, in short). Ye found that the IIAPP affects both the merger offer premium and the offer-acceptance probability. We compute the IIAPP in our sample and find it to be highly positively correlated with the TAPP (the correlation coefficient between these measures is 0.82). However, the TAPP dominates the IIAPP in explaining the merger premium. Thus, our first contribution is that we offer a new measure of the average purchase price of all target shareholders (not just institutional investors) that is more successful in explaining the merger-related variables. We believe that measures similar to the TAPP would perform well in other empirical studies that require a purchasing price estimate. In

any case, the average purchase price measure that we develop is more tractable and easier to compute than the “sectorial” IIAPP measure of Frazzini (2006).

We further show that two reference prices (the TAPP and the 52-week high) are complementary in explaining the merger offer premium. Both measures significantly impact merger decisions in a way consistent with behavioral theories, and are about equal in their magnitude. Thus, the purchasing price effect, possibly emanating from investors’ mental accounting, appears to be additive to the well-known 52-week-high effect of Baker et al. (2012) that presumably reflects investors’ regrets.

Our second major contribution is the finding that behavioral factors affect merger decisions primarily (and practically solely) through their effect on the deal terms—i.e., the offer premium. The offer premium increases significantly with losses relative to reference prices. For example, when on the eve of the offer, target shareholders are in a 10% loss relative to TAPP and in a 10% loss relative to the 52-week high, the additional premium they are offered is about 10%, i.e. the bidder offers full compensation for their losses. However, full compensation is prevalent only for small losses, as the extra premium offered for larger losses is diminishing in loss size.

In contrast, the explanatory contribution of reference prices in our Probit analysis of the accept/reject decision is meager. In fact, in a test sample of 3,432 merger offer proposals we calculate the accept/reject predictions of a Probit model without reference prices and find them to be almost identical to those of a Probit model with reference prices. Apparently, behavioral variables help determine the merger offer premium, yet once this premium is determined, their effect on the offer-acceptance decision is practically negligible. In other words, our evidence suggests that bidders adjust their merger offer price to the point at which the target shareholder purchase price does not inhibit offer acceptance.

Overall, our findings indicate that bidders commonly (partially) compensate target shareholders for a drop in target stock market price since they have purchased the shares. Bidders also appear to examine their own stock price and decrease the offer premium the closer their pre-offer stock price is to the 52-week high. These results shed new light on the “black-box” of private negotiations between the acquirer and target before a merger deal is publicly announced.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a review of previous literature on merger decisions and behavioral effects on these decisions. Section 3 outlines the development of our new measure, TAPP, and presents our testable hypotheses. Section 4 describes the sample and the data. Sections 5 and 6 summarize and discuss results of an empirical analysis of offer premium- and offer-acceptance decisions, respectively. Section 7 concludes.

## **2. Background and Previous Literature**

### **2.1. Factors Affecting Offer Premiums and Merger Decisions**

Neoclassical theory predicts that mergers add value when the two companies are worth more together than apart.<sup>1</sup> If the two companies are worth more together, the acquirer should go ahead with the acquisition only if her gains exceed the costs. A major cost component is the premium the buyer pays above the seller’s stand-alone value. In a rational world, bidders offer a price that reflects the intrinsic value of the target within the combined firm. In turn, target shareholders decide to vote for or against the proposed merger based on the price premium offered (the premium of offer price relative to the target’s pre-offer stock price).

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<sup>1</sup> In addition to sheer economies of scale, synergy gains can emanate from complementarity, wherein each party has what the other needs (e.g., a small firm with a unique product and a large company that can produce and market it on a large scale). Mergers also add value when a synergy gain is obtained via replacing an inefficient management—i.e., as a takeover technique.

Palepu (1986) identified several target firm characteristics correlated with a bidder's decisions. Low-growth, resource-rich firms are natural acquisition targets, as well as high-growth, resource-poor firms (when funding difficulties are due to asymmetric information). Firm size is also a factor, as it correlates with the "transaction costs" associated with acquiring a firm. Such costs include those associated with the target's absorption into the acquirer's organizational framework, as well as costs associated with fighting a prolonged battle that a target may wage to defend itself. The market-to-book ratio and price-earning multiplier are also used as proxies for "cheap" buys—i.e., firms whose market values are low compared to their book values or earnings per share levels.

In a comprehensive survey on the determinants of merger decisions, Betton, Eckbo, and Thorburn (2008) pointed at several explanatory variables that are grouped into target characteristics, bidder characteristics, and deal characteristics. These include stock illiquidity (such as trading volume, and exchange listed on), the target stock price runup prior to the initial bid, and the existence of a poison pill (a shareholder rights plan allowing existing target shareholders to dilute a hostile takeover bid). The authors also consider whether the target and bidder are related (i.e., same industry), whether the target rejects negotiations (resulting in the bid considered hostile), the form of payment (cash, stock, or combined), and whether rival bidders are involved in the contest. The authors show that these factors affect offer premiums, completion rates, and offer-announcement stock returns.

## **2.2. Behavioral Aspects of Merger Decisions**

Merger decisions may also be affected by behavioral aspects. For example, the basic motive for the merger may be target stock mispricing that is potentially due to shareholder irrationality. Abstracting from mispricing at the market level, behavioral scholars have examined

the effects of psychological, cognitive, and emotional factors on the decisions of bidders and targets in the merger context. Boone and Mulherin (2007) showed that private negotiations exist between the bidder and target in the period before a merger deal is publicly announced. Hence, bidder and target behavioral biases are at least partly revealed.

Roll (1986) suggested that bidder managers may be excessively optimistic and overconfident in their own valuation of deal synergies and fail to properly account for the winner's curse. Roll's "hubris" hypothesis received support from the well-documented negative acquirer returns around acquisition announcements, as well as from the poor performance after acquisition announcements, as surveyed in Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2005). This evidence suggests that some mergers lack strong economic justification and are subject to agency problems and behavioral biases of the firms' top management.<sup>2</sup>

In the present study we primarily discuss the impact of target shareholders' behavioral biases. Prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) proposes that individuals use a reference price and react differently to a potential gain or loss relative to such a price. Such gain\loss asymmetry has been confirmed in controlled experiments (see, for example, Brocas, Carrillo, Giga and Zapatero (2019)). Further, the vast empirical literature on the disposition effect (Shefrin and Statman, 1985), and more recently the cognitive dissonance thesis (Kaustia, 2010; Chang, Solomon, and Westerfield, 2016; Fischbacher, Hoffmann, and Schudy, 2017; Hamdani, Lauterbach, and Mugerman, 2020), has suggested that shareholders use their share purchase price as a reference or even reservation price.

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<sup>2</sup> Studies have established the dependence of merger decisions on bidder CEO personal traits, including overconfidence (Malmendier and Tate, 2008), narcissism (Aktas, De Bodt, Bollaert and Roll, 2016), gender (Levi, Li and Zhang, 2010; Huang and Kisgen, 2013; Levi, Li and Zhang, 2014), and even life experience (Bernile, Bhagwat, and Rau, 2017).

In the context of merger activity, several studies have shown that merger decisions depend on reference prices. Baker, Pan and Wurgler (2012) found that recent peaks in the target stock price (and in particular the 52-week high) affect offer prices and merger completion likelihood. The offer premium increases with the ratio of the 52-week high to the pre-offer target stock price, and offer acceptance likelihood jumps when the offer price exceeds the 52-week high. Baker et al. (2012) interpreted their evidence as suggesting that the 52-week high is an important reference price for the various sides involved in the deal (including even the “neutral” advisors and financiers). For target firm shareholders, it represents a price at which they could have recently sold. Thus, in order to mitigate any regrets and convince target management and shareholders to accept a merger offer, the bidder has to adjust the offer price according to the ratio of the pre-offer target stock price to the target 52-week-high price. Interestingly, Ma, Whidbee and Zhang (2019) documented that a bidder’s 52-week high also affects the offer premium, especially in deals in which bidder valuation is relatively uncertain.

Another reference price important to target shareholders is the stock purchase price. Frazzini (2006) developed a measure of institutional investors’ purchase price and Ye (2014) used it to show that the disposition effect accurately predicts public’s response to a merger offer.<sup>3</sup> Ye (2014) inferred whether an institutional investor is prone to the disposition effect by analyzing the investor’s historical trading pattern—that is, whether the institutional investor is more ready to sell a winner than a loser. When “disposition-effect inclined” institutional investors are excluded, the

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<sup>3</sup> The method of identifying the disposition effect is based on Odean (1998). Specifically, an institutional investor is said to be prone to the disposition effect if its proportion of gains realized (PGR) is greater than the proportion of losses realized (PLR). PGR is the number of realized gains (i.e., when the current market price is higher than the estimated purchase cost, and the investor sells) divided by the number of realized gains plus the number of paper (unrealized) gains (i.e., when the current market price is higher than the estimated purchase cost, and the investor does not sell). PLR is the number of realized losses divided by the number of realized losses plus the number of paper (unrealized) losses.

impact of institutional investors' purchase price on merger decisions diminishes or disappears. Given Ye's evidence, it is possible that institutional investors' purchase price can serve as a proxy for "all investors" purchase price, a possibility that we discuss in the next section in which we also develop a new measure of average purchase price.

### **3. Measures of the Average Purchase Price and Hypotheses**

#### **3.1. A New Measure of the Average Purchase Price**

Suppose we have data on daily prices, volumes of trade and outstanding number of shares for a specific stock, and are interested in computing a measure of the average purchase price of its current (say day T) shareholders. The ideal estimate is a weighted average of past prices, where the weight of a particular past price approximates the proportion of current shareholders that bought the share at that price and held it till day T. An immediate plausible assumption is that the higher was the turnover (volume divided by outstanding shares) on that past date, the higher is its weight. However, a second factor must be considered, as shareholders who purchased the stock further back in time (on day  $T - \tau$ , where  $\tau$  is large) are more likely to have sold it by day T. Therefore, an appropriate measure of current shareholders average purchase price should also discount more heavily prices that are further back in time.

Our method for discounting more heavily further away prices is based on the Proportional Trading Model (PTM) frequently used by courts in class-action suits for assessing the damage caused by a security fraud. Furbush and Smith (1994) discussed this model and its application in litigation.

The PTM postulates that on trading day  $t$ , each existing shareholder of stock  $i$  sells a proportion  $x_{i,t}$  of her holdings regardless of their longevity. Accordingly,  $x_{i,t}$  can be estimated as the proportion of stock  $i$ 's outstanding shares traded on day  $t$ , that is:

$$(1) \quad x_{i,t} = \frac{\text{Number of shares of } i \text{ traded on day } t}{\text{Total number of shares of } i \text{ outstanding on day } t} .$$

We define the average purchase price of share  $i$  at time  $T$  as the weighted average of past share prices in which the share price on each trading day  $t$  in the past receives a weight according to the proportion of existing shareholders at time  $T$  that bought and held stock  $i$  since day  $t$ . For example, if the total shares outstanding of stock  $i$  is constant at 1 million shares, 1,000 shares were bought on day  $t$ , yet 600 of these shares were sold by day  $T$ , then  $\alpha_{i,t}^T$ , the proportion of outstanding shares of  $i$  at time  $T$  purchased on day  $t$  in the past is:  $(1000-600)/1,000,000 = 0.0004$ .

Returning to our specific problem of estimating the average target stock purchase price at the merger offer date, suppose we are at market close on the day of an offer (day  $T$ ) and wish to assess the series of  $\alpha_{i,t}^T$ 's, the proportion of outstanding shares of  $i$  at time  $T$  (offer date) purchased on day  $t$  in the past. First, according to Eq. (1), the proportion of outstanding shares at the end of day  $T$  purchased during day  $T$  is:

$$(2) \quad \alpha_{i,T}^T = x_{i,T} .$$

For example, if 0.5% of the outstanding shares were traded on day  $T$ , then, at the end of day  $T$ , 0.5% of the shares were purchased at the day  $T$  price. Progressing backwards to day  $T-1$ ,

$$(3) \quad \alpha_{i,T-1}^T = x_{i,T-1} \cdot (1 - x_{i,T}) .$$

To demonstrate, if 0.6% (0.006) of outstanding shares were traded on day  $T-1$ , 99.5% of them were still held on day  $T$  close (0.5% were sold on day  $T$ ; see above). Thus, among all shareholders

of  $i$  on day  $T$  close, the fraction of shares bought on day  $T-1$  is  $0.006$  times  $0.995 = 0.000597$ .

More generally,

$$(4) \alpha_{i,t}^T = x_{i,t} \cdot \prod_{k=t+1}^T (1 - x_{i,k}).$$

Given the series of  $\alpha$ 's, the average purchase price of the shares of stock  $i$  held at the end of day  $T$ ,  $TAPP_{i,T}$ , can be calculated as the following weighted average:

$$(5) TAPP_{i,T} = \sum_{t=2}^T \alpha_{i,t}^T \cdot P_{i,t} + \left(1 - \sum_{t=2}^T \alpha_{i,t}^T\right) \cdot P_{i,1},$$

where  $t$  is a counter of stock  $i$ 's day of trade on the exchange,  $t = 1$  is the stock's first day of trade on the exchange, and  $P_{i,t}$  is the price of stock  $i$  on the exchange on day  $t$ . In Eq. (5), each trading-day price is weighted according to its  $\alpha$ , which is its share in shareholding at the focal day  $T$  (the merger offer date in our case). The remaining weight, unaccounted by the sum of  $\alpha$ 's, is then attributed to the price of stock  $i$  on its first day of trade on the exchange.

In retrospective, TAPP accomplishes our initial conditions for an adequate purchase price estimator. By its definition in Eq. (4), the weight  $\alpha$  assigned to a particular past price considers both the daily turnover on that day,  $x_{i,t}$ , and the attrition over time in veteran investor holdings (the fact that they might have sold the shares by our focal time  $T$ ). This attrition in holdings is accounted for by setting a diminishing weight to earlier prices, the  $\prod_{k=t+1}^T (1 - x_{i,k})$  factor in Eq. (4), where the discount on an early date (say day  $t$ ) price depends on the trading activity or turnover in the stock during the period between day  $t$  and day  $T$ . By Eq. (4), the higher is the turnover in the stock, the more heavily are past prices discounted, i.e., the lower is the weight of the price on a particular day  $t$  in the past. This discounting method appears to us plausible, hence we conclude that the TAPP measure, as defined in Eq. (5), is a legitimate purchasing price estimator.

Nonetheless, TAPP also has some deficiencies. First, it relies on the PTM, which is only a rough approximation of trading. It is clear that not every shareholder trades every day or sells a proportion  $x_{i,t}$  of her holdings every day. However, for average purchase price estimation we only need to describe the aggregate behavior of shareholders who purchased the stock on day  $t$ ; thus, PTM becomes more palatable. The PTM also ignores within-day trading—i.e., trading by robots or investors that open and close their stock positions (perhaps even several times) within the same trading day. Given the above criticism, Barclay and Torchio (2001) examine more elaborate trading models, including models with two types of shareholders (passive and active) and models allowing recent purchasers of the stock to have a higher or lower likelihood of selling the stock by date  $T$ . In their tests, none of these more elaborate models outperformed the PTM, hence Barclay and Torchio (2001) recommend sticking with the PTM.

The second limitation is that in practice our calculations employ several simplifying assumptions. For example, in Eq. (5), we should have used the IPO price for the remaining weight  $(1 - \sum \alpha_{i,t})$ .<sup>4</sup> We instead use the stock price on its first day of trade on the exchange. However, the error created by this deviation is relatively small, as most stocks are veterans on the exchange, hence the weight assigned to the first day of trade is typically minute. Another practical deviation is that although we correct prices for splits, we ignore cash dividends and other distributions that may affect the shareholders' perceived purchase price.

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<sup>4</sup> If IPO price is known, the following formula is appropriate:  $TAPP_{i,T} = \sum_{t=1}^T \alpha_{i,t}^T \cdot P_{i,t} + (1 - \sum_{t=1}^T \alpha_{i,t}^T) \cdot P_{i,0}$ , where  $P_{i,0}$  is the IPO price, and  $P_{i,1}$  is the stock  $i$  closing price on its first day of trade on the exchange.

It is interesting to examine how well our new measure, TAPP, fares with explaining the merger offer premium and the merger-offer acceptance likelihood. However, before we do so, we review another potential purchase price estimator.

### 3.2. The Institutional Investors' Average Purchase Price

Frazzini (2006) developed the Institutional Investors Average Purchase Price (IIAPP, in short). Institutional investors are required to report their equity holding information on a quarterly basis. These data are available on SEC Form 13F (s34 files on WRDS). Frazzini (2006) assessed the number of shares of stock  $i$  purchased or sold by institutional investor  $Y$  during quarter  $t$  by computing the difference in the number of  $i$  shares held by institutional investor  $Y$  between the end of quarter  $t$  and the end of quarter  $t-1$ . Stock  $i$ 's price at the report date (end of the quarter) is used as a proxy for the institutional investor's purchase price. For each stock-institutional investor combination, Frazzini generated a queue of all purchases and sales over time. Holdings that were purchased first are assumed to be sold first (a First-In-First-Out inventory system). This process affords assessing the purchase date and price of each share of stock  $i$  held by each institutional investor at the end of each quarter. Next, we compute for each institutional investor the weighted purchase price for the inventory of shares of stock  $i$  held by this institutional investor at the end of the quarter preceding the merger announcement date:

$$(6) \text{ APP}_{Y,i,T} = \sum_{t=0}^T \alpha_{Y,i,t}^T \cdot P_{i,t} ,$$

where  $\text{APP}_{Y,i,T}$  is the average purchase price of the  $i$  shares held by institutional investor  $Y$  at time  $T$  (end of the quarter preceding the merger offer date),  $\alpha_{Y,i,t}^T$  is the proportion of institutional

investor Y's holdings of stock i at time T that was purchased in quarter t in the past,<sup>5</sup> and  $P_{i,t}$  is the price of stock i on the exchange at the end of quarter t. For example, if institutional investor Y's current inventory consists of 500 shares bought in quarter T-2 and 250 shares bought in quarter T-1, Eq. (6) tells us that the average purchase price by institutional investor Y is two-thirds of the stock price at the end of quarter T-2 plus one-third of the stock price at the end of quarter T-1.

Last, following Ye (2014), we estimate the IIAPP as a weighted average of all institutional investors' purchase prices. The weight assigned to institutional investor Y's purchase price is its proportion of the total institutional investors' holdings of stock i at the end of the quarter preceding the merger announcement date. The resulting estimate is as follows:

$$(7) \text{IIAPP}_{i,T} = \sum_{Y=1}^N w_{Y,i,t}^T \cdot \text{APP}_{Y,i,T},$$

where  $\text{IIAPP}_{i,T}$  is institutional investors' (weighted) average purchase price of stock i shares as of time T,  $\text{APP}_{Y,i,T}$  is the corresponding average purchase price of institutional investor Y,  $w_{Y,i,t}^T$  is the proportion of institutional investor Y in the total institutional investors holdings at time T, and N is the number of institutional investors holding stock i.

IIAPP, the institutional investors' average purchase price, has several deficiencies as an estimator of all investors' average purchase price. The "all investors" universe also includes retail/individual investors who may behave (trade and hold shares) differently than institutional investors (Shapira and Venezia, 2001; Barber and Odean, 2002; Dhar and Zhu, 2006; Barber and Odean, 2008; Lauterbach and Mugerman, 2020). Thus, the IIAPP may misestimate all investors' average purchase price, especially for stocks in which institutional investors' total holdings are

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<sup>5</sup>  $\alpha_{Y,i,t}^T$  is computed based on the inventory book of institutional investor Y as  $N_{Y,i,t}^T / N_{Y,i}^T$ , where  $N_{Y,i,t}^T$  is the number of shares of i that were bought by institutional investor Y on quarter t and held till end of quarter T, and  $N_{Y,i}^T$  is the total number of shares of i held by institutional investor Y at the end of quarter T.

relatively modest (i.e., account for only a small proportion of the stock's outstanding shares). Thus, in essence, the IIAPP is only a partial or sectorial measure of the purchase price. Some imprecision is introduced also by the assumption that all shares are purchased or sold at the end of the quarter.

### **3.3. Hypotheses**

Previous empirical studies have demonstrated that behavioral reference prices such as Baker et al.'s (2012) 52-week high and Ye's (2014) weighted purchase price of institutional investors affect the merger offer premium as well as the offer acceptance rate. Following the vast literature on the behavioral importance of stock purchase price, we expect the target average purchase price (TAPP) to be a relevant and influential reference price as well. Accordingly, we propose:

**Hypothesis 1:** The merger offer premium depends on the ratio of the target shareholders' average purchase price (TAPP) to the pre-offer target-stock price.

Practically, we propose that the bidder will adjust the offer price upwards when the pre-offer target price is below the TAPP in order to mitigate the "loss" feelings of most target shareholders. Conversely, when target shareholders are in profit (the pre-offer target price exceeds TAPP), the bidder may try to shear off some of the offer premium, capitalizing on the winning sentiment of the target shareholders.

Our second hypothesis based on previous research of reference prices is as follows:

**Hypothesis 2:** The merger-offer acceptance likelihood is higher when the offer price is higher than the target shareholders' average purchase price (TAPP).

This hypothesis confirms TAPP as a reference price for target firm shareholders.

It is noteworthy that our new measure, TAPP, refers to a different behavioral aspect than the 52-week high. Thus, we expect it to have an impact on shareholders' decisions that is complementary and additive to that of the 52-week high. Relative to Ye's (2004) IIAPP measure, TAPP is a substitute as both measures intend to represent the purchase price effect. However, given the deficiencies of both the TAPP and IIAPP measures there might emerge some empirical complementarity between them. Therefore, we advance the following:

**Hypothesis 3:** The TAPP effect on the merger offer premium and the merger completion likelihood does not subsume the effects of other reference prices.

## **4. Sample and Data Description**

### **4.1. Sample Construction**

We examine all mergers of U.S. public firms between 1990 and 2019 available on the SDC M&A (by Thomson Reuters) database. All detailed data on the offers and deals (such as offer price, form of payment, and more) are from this SDC file. Two of our purchase-price measures (TAPP and 52-week high) are constructed using daily stock prices and volumes extracted from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), while the IIAPP computation utilizes institutional ownership data from 13F filings of institutional investors retrieved from Thomson Reuters. Last, various firm characteristics and accounting data are collected from Compustat.

Similar to previous studies, we exclude divestitures, repurchases, self-tenders, and rumored deals, as well as any offers for which the offer price is missing on the SDC database. Following Bates, Becher, and Lemmon (2008), in cases of multiple deals involving the same target and bidder in the same year, we include only the initial bid. Following Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) and Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009), we exclude deals in which the target firm is dual-class, as it

is difficult to track down the bid structure across different share classes. Last, there are a few well-documented issues with merging our data sources: CRSP only covers major stock exchanges (NYSE, AMEX, NASDAQ), Compustat only covers firms with stock market capitalization above \$100 million, and 13F filings do not account for short positions. Our final sample comprises 4910 merger offers.

#### **4.2. Descriptive Statistics of the Merger Offers**

Figure 1 depicts the yearly distribution of merger offers in our sample, spanning from 1990 to 2019. The number of offers per year varies from 65 in 1992 and 2019 to 427 in 1999. The average (median) number of offers is 164 (125). There is a surge in merger activity in the late 1990s, followed by a relatively calm activity period in the twenty-first century (with two local spikes in 2007 and 2015).

[Insert Figure 1 about here]

Table 1 describes the sample firms and merger offer characteristics. All variables are winsorized at their 2.5% and 97.5% levels and refer to the fiscal year preceding the merger offer. We first review the target firm characteristics. The mean total assets of our target firms are approximately \$1.3 billion U.S. dollars, yet the median is only \$300 million U.S. dollars. Target firms' profitability is relatively poor, with a mean return on assets of about -0.03 (median is 0.01), yet the mean sales growth of about 20% (median is 10%) appears relatively solid. The mean leverage (debt divided by total assets), 0.16, is relatively modest. Target firm stock prices demonstrate a mean price earnings ratio of 11.1 (median is 12.5) and a mean market-to-book value ratio of 2.5 (median is 1.7).

[Insert Table 1 about here]

Table 1 also reviews our bidder firms. The sample size decreases to 3,816 mainly because the bidder is either a small U.S. public firm or a public foreign firm (such firms are not covered by CRSP and Compustat). On average, bidder firms are much larger than target firms. Their mean total assets of \$12.8 billion U.S. dollars are almost ten-fold that of target firms. Bidder firm mean and median return on assets of 0.03 is also higher than that of target firms. The mean sales growth of bidder firms is 25%, slightly higher than that of target firms. Bidder firm leverage is similar to that of target firms, with an average debt-to-total assets ratio of 0.16. It is also evident that bidder stock pricing is significantly higher than that of the target stock, with a mean price-earnings ratio of 19.1 and a mean market-to-book ratio of 3.4 (compared to 11.1 and 2.5 in target firms, respectively). Last, it is interesting to note that the mean number of previous merger offers made by a bidder firm in our sample is 1.46. Apparently, some bidders are prolific and use mergers repeatedly as their growth strategy. We find that the upper decile of our 2,432 unique bidders made 1,492 (about 30% of the) merger offers, and the top bidder made 29 offers. We control for experienced bidders in our empirical analysis.

On the bottom of Table 1 we review some of the merger offer characteristics. Thirty-six percent of the offers are cash-only (promise the entire payment in cash), 35% are shares-only offers, and the rest offer some mix of cash and securities or their method of payment is unknown (missing in SDC files). The vast majority of the merger offers, 93.8%, are friendly—i.e., the offers are negotiated, agreed upon, and recommended by target and bidder managements and board of directors. Interestingly though, only 86.7% of the merger offers are eventually completed and result in an actual merger deal. Also, interesting, in about 33% of the merger offers, the bidder and target are from different industries, representing “diversifying” merger attempts, and in about 7% of the cases we find multiple bidders (for the same target firm) contemporaneously.

Table 2 reviews several price ratios that are potentially relevant for the merger offer. To mitigate the effect of outliers, we winsorize all price ratios at the 2.5% and 97.5% levels and employ a natural log transformation (Ln) of the price ratios. The first price ratio examined is the offer premium, assessed as the ratio of the merger offer price to the target-stock market price 21 trading days before the offer announcement date (day A-21, henceforth). We choose the stock price 21 trading days (roughly a calendar month) prior to the offer announcement as our baseline price, following observations of an upward drift in target-company stock price in that month. This drift, probably due to information leaks, is part of the merger premium, thus we account for it. The mean offer premium is about 32%, and it is identical to the mean premium reported in Table 2 of Baker et al.'s (2012) sample of mergers and acquisitions.

We further distinguish between failed offers and accepted offers (i.e., completed deals). Interestingly, the mean offer premium is only slightly and insignificantly higher in accepted offers. This finding indicates that the relation between offer premium and offer acceptance likelihood is less identifiable than initially perceived.

[Insert Table 2 about here]

The rest of the price ratios in Table 2 are related to potential behavioral effects. The mean (median) Ln of the TAPP ratio to the target stock price on day A-21 is 0.052 (-0.028). This indicates that roughly half of the merger offers arrive when target shareholders are, on average, at a "loss." The mean and median Ln of the IIAPP ratio to the target stock price on day A-21 are 0.084 and -0.024, respectively, reinforcing the above "loss" findings regarding TAPP. Last, the mean Ln of the ratio of the target stock pre-offer 52-week high price to the target stock price on day A-21 is 0.338, compared to 0.348 in Baker et al. (2012), which demonstrates that many stocks trade markedly below their yearly high at the time of the merger offer. Notably, although Equations

(5) and (6) tell us to compute TAPP and IIAPP at the offer date, we compute them on day A-21. i.e., we use past prices only up to day A-21. This creates some consistency – merger offer price is compared not only to the stock market price on day A-21 but also to the various reference prices (TAPP, IAAPP and the 52-week High) relevant as of that date.

Table 2 also shows the mean behavioral price ratios in failed and accepted offers. For all ratios, the mean is significantly higher in failed offers. This suggests that if, at the time of the offer announcement, target shareholders have deeper losses relative to their reference prices (purchase price and 52-week high price), the offer completion likelihood diminishes.

The bottom row in Table 2 regards a bidder behavioral price ratio, which is the ratio of the bidder stock pre-offer 52-week high price to the bidder stock price 21 trading days before the offer announcement (day A-21). Ma et al. (2019) found that the merger premium is negatively correlated to this price ratio, and the effect emanates from the subsample of offers involving payment in shares (see Table 6 in their paper). It appears that the bidders whose stock trades close to its 52-week high price are more generous to target shareholders, perhaps because they think their stock price is inflated and do not mind paying others with it. The mean Ln of the ratio of the bidder stock pre-offer 52-week high price to the bidder stock price on day A-21 is 0.194, much lower than its counterpart in target stocks. This suggests that the bidder firm stock is, on average, in relatively better shape at the time of the offer than the target firm stock. Interestingly, for failed offers, this bidder price ratio is significantly higher than for completed merger deals, suggesting that target shareholders are more reluctant to merge with a bidder company that is far from its peak. However, no conclusions can be drawn without a more rigorous formal analysis.

## 5. Behavioral Effects on the Offer Premium

### 5.1. The Impact of Target Shareholders' Reference Prices

Table 3 examines the potential reference price effects on the merger offer premiums and documents the effect of each reference price separately. The main regression specification is:

$$(8) \quad Offer_{Prem} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Ref_{Price}_{Prem} + D'\gamma + T'\delta + Fixed + \varepsilon,$$

where  $Offer_{Prem}$  (offer premium) is defined as  $\text{Ln}\left(\frac{\text{offer price}}{\text{stock price A-21}}\right)$ , and stock price A-21 is the stock price 21 trading days prior to the offer announcement date, and  $Ref_{Price}_{Prem}$  is the premium of the reference price relative to stock price A-21. We employ three alternative reference prices; hence, for example,  $TAPP_{Prem} = \text{Ln}\left(\frac{TAPP}{\text{stock price A-21}}\right)$ . Among control variables,  $D'$  is a vector of deal characteristics,  $T'$  is a vector of target firm characteristics,  $Fixed$  represents calendar year fixed effects and industry fixed effects, and  $\varepsilon$  is an error term clustered at the target firm level.

The first two columns in Table 3 aim to establish our benchmark regression, encompassing the effect of non-reference price factors (various deal and target characteristics) on the offer premium. The first regression uses explanatory variables mentioned in previous research (see our review in Section 2.1), while the second regression, in Column (2), is its parsimonious form. The parsimonious regression shows that target characteristics such as target size, as well as deal characteristics such as the form of payment, affect the offer premium.

[Insert Table 3 about here]

Columns (3) and (4) review the effect of the target shareholders' average purchase price (TAPP) premium on the offer premium, essentially examining the extent to which the offer premium is influenced by our novel measure of the target shareholders' average purchase price. In

Column (3) we show that the TAPP premium (the natural logarithm of the TAPP ratio to the pre-offer stock price) has a significant effect on the merger offer price. The higher the TAPP, the higher the TAPP\_Prem and the higher the offer premium. This evidence establishes that shareholders' purchase price, approximated by the TAPP, is a relevant reference price with real economic effects.

Column (4) elaborates the relation by distinguishing between the cases in which target shareholders are probably in a “loss” situation on the eve of the offer,  $\text{Ln}\left(\frac{TAPP}{\text{stock price A-21}}\right) > 0$ , and cases in which target shareholders are in “mental gain” territory,  $\text{Ln}\left(\frac{TAPP}{\text{stock price A-21}}\right) < 0$ . We build a pair of explanatory variables: Negative\_TAPP\_Prem that equals TAPP\_Prem as long as TAPP\_Prem is negative (and equals 0 otherwise) and Positive\_TAPP\_Prem that equals TAPP\_Prem as long as TAPP\_Prem is positive (and equals 0 otherwise).

According to Baker et al. (2012), estimating the effect of behavioral reference prices on the offer premium requires a piecewise regression. Assuming an S-curve utility function (a-la prospect theory), shareholders' marginal utility loss diminishes as loss increases, and their marginal utility gain diminishes as the gain increases. This implies higher marginal compensation for small (close to zero) losses and higher marginal premium concessions when perceived gain is small (close to zero).

Following Baker et al. (2012), we run piecewise regressions. We divide all cases with gains (pre-offer price larger than the TAPP) into three equal subsamples (small, medium, and large gains), in which the cutoffs between these three subsamples are gains of 0.109 and 0.241. Similarly, we divide all loss cases (pre-offer price smaller than the TAPP) into three equal subsamples, with cutoffs losses of 0.121 and 0.366 that separate them. We then construct six TAPP\_Prem variables, three for positive TAPP\_Prem (loss situations) and three for negative

TAPP\_Prem (gain situations). These new explanatory variables are denoted as Positive\_TAPP\_Prem\_X where X is small, medium, or large, and Negative\_TAPP\_Prem\_X where X is small, medium, or large. To illustrate, Positive\_TAPP\_Prem\_Small is set equal to 0 when TAPP\_Prem is negative, equal to TAPP\_Prem when  $0 < \text{TAPP\_Prem} \leq 0.121$ , and equal to 0.121 when  $\text{TAPP\_Prem} > 0.121$ ; Positive\_TAPP\_Prem\_Medium is set equal to 0 when  $\text{TAPP\_Prem} \leq 0.121$ , equal to  $\text{TAPP\_Prem} - 0.121$  when  $0.121 < \text{TAPP\_Prem} \leq 0.366$ , and equal to 0.245 ( $=0.366-0.121$ ) when  $\text{TAPP\_Prem} > 0.366$ ; Positive\_TAPP\_Prem\_Large is set equal to 0 when  $\text{TAPP\_Prem} \leq 0.366$ , and equal to  $\text{TAPP\_Prem} - 0.366$  when  $\text{TAPP\_Prem} > 0.366$ . Similar logic governs the construction of the piecewise Negative\_TAPP\_Prem variables in which the cutoffs between small, medium, and large Negative\_TAPP\_Prem variables are -0.109 and -0.241.

The results of the piecewise regression in Column (4) are consistent with prospect theory. The coefficient of (or marginal compensation for) small losses is larger than that of medium and large losses, supporting diminishing marginal compensations for losses. Only the marginal compensations for small and medium losses are statistically significant at the 1% and 10% levels, respectively. This evidence adds to the basic evidence in Column (3) by demonstrating that the relation between perceived losses and the offer premium is non-linear: offer premiums are higher when losses are deep, yet the compensation for deep losses as a proportion of the loss is smaller than the corresponding proportional compensation (=adjustment of offer price) for relatively small losses.

The coefficients of the three Negative\_TAPP\_prem variables are also interesting, representing gain situations. Consistent with prospect theory, they also decrease as the perceived gain increases. Only the small and medium coefficients are statistically significant at the 5% level. Given that in gain situations the TAPP\_Prem is negative, the positive coefficients in such situations

imply that when target shareholders are in a gain situation on the eve of the offer, they obtain a less generous or trimmed offer premium. Apparently, the bidder cuts the offer premium as the investment in target stock becomes more profitable for the target shareholders. Hence, bidders are not only “considerate” regarding target shareholders’ losses, but also somewhat “exploitative” when target shareholders are in gain situations. However, it is noteworthy that in our more advanced analyses, reviewed later in this paper, the coefficients of TAPP\_Prem in gain situations become small and statistically insignificant. Thus, the compensation that target shareholders receive in loss situations is much higher than any deduction in premiums in gain situations.

Baker et al. (2012) proposed and advocated the pre-offer 52-week-high price of target stock as a pertinent reference price for merger offers. Thus, in Columns (5) and (6) we present results of regular- and piecewise-offer premium regressions that employ the 52-week-high premium (HIGH\_Prem) as explanatory variables. Note that HIGH\_Prem is by definition non-negative because the pre-offer 52-week-high price is always at least equal to the pre-offer target price. Accordingly, in the piecewise regressions we use only three positive HIGH\_Prem variables, representing small, medium, and large perceived losses relative to the 52-week high, with cutoffs of 0.100 and 0.349 between them.

Column (5) verifies Baker et al.’s (2012) evidence that the 52-week-high price is a relevant reference price. The higher the HIGH\_Prem—the perceived target shareholders’ loss on the eve of the merger offer—the higher the offer premium, *ceteris paribus*. The bidder appears to partially compensate target shareholders for their regrets regarding missing out on selling their holding at the 52-week-high price.

The piecewise regressions are also consistent with Baker et al.’s (2012) evidence and with prospect theory. The coefficient of (or marginal compensation for) small losses relative to the 52-

week high is larger than that of medium and large losses, supporting diminishing marginal compensations for losses. This illustrates that the relation between offer premium and the perceived loss relative to the 52-week high is non-linear with smaller losses commanding a more generous proportional compensation.

Columns (7) and (8) of Table 3 summarize results with our third reference price candidate—that is, the IIAPP, the institutional investors' average purchase price. Consistent with the evidence in Ye (2014) we report in Column (7) that the coefficient of IIAPP\_Prem is positive and statistically significant. The IIAPP is a purchase price estimate, hence when IIAPP\_Prem is positive, and institutional target shareholders are probably in loss, the bidder takes these losses into account and raises offer premium *ceteris paribus*. On the other hand, when IIAPP\_Prem is negative and institutional target shareholders are probably in gain, the bidder trims the merger offer premium.

The piecewise regression, summarized in Column (8), uses 0.151 and 0.512 as cutoffs to differentiate between small, medium, and large Positive\_IIAPP\_Prem; and cutoffs of -0.143 and -0.377 serve to define small, medium, and large Negative\_IIAPP\_Prem. The IIAPP piecewise regression reveals the same key attribute as the former two reference price piecewise regressions—namely, bidders offer diminishing marginal compensation for target shareholders' losses. The coefficient of Positive\_IIAPP\_Prem\_Small is statistically significant and larger than the rest of the loss-related coefficients, indicating a higher marginal compensation when target shareholders' losses are small. Further, the gain-related coefficients in Column (8) are smaller than the loss-related coefficients and mostly statistically insignificant. It appears that the increase in merger offer price in the case of losing target shareholders is larger than the decrease in merger offer price

when facing target shareholders with prior profits. This asymmetry illustrates that bidders take target shareholders' psychological difficulties into account before making a merger offer.

The adjusted R-squared of the offer premium regressions employing IIAPP are, however, somewhat lower than their counterparts in Columns (3) to (6) that employ the TAPP and High as the pertinent reference prices. This raises the question of how the reference prices all fare together.

## **5.2. Are the Reference Prices Mutually Exclusive?**

Table 4 examines all possible combinations of our three reference prices. We wish to test for example, whether the effects of HIGH\_Prem and TAPP\_Prem are complementary, that is, co-exist side by side. The same question pertains also to the pair TAPP\_Prem and IIAPP\_Prem that are alternative measures of the target shareholders' purchase price.

In Column (1), we use both TAPP\_Prem and HIGH\_Prem as explanatory variables, and each scores a positive and statistically significant coefficient. The coefficients of TAPP\_Prem and HIGH\_Prem in Column (1) are smaller than their respective coefficients in Columns (3) and (5) of Table 3 in which we examine the stand-alone effect of each. This is probably due to the correlation between TAPP\_Prem and HIGH\_Prem that equals 0.80. The use of both reference price premiums increase the adjusted-R<sup>2</sup> of the offer premium regression relative to the corresponding single-reference price versions in Table 3, suggesting that their effects are complementary. Bidders appear to take into account both target shareholders' mental accounting considerations (represented by TAPP\_Prem) and their feelings of regret (represented by HIGH\_Prem).

The piecewise regressions in Column (2) reinforce our previous findings that: (1) bidders take target shareholders' behavioral factors (mental accounting and regretful feelings) into

account; (2) the marginal compensation (increase in offer premium) for actual losses (losses relative to TAPP) and perceived losses (losses relative to the high price) are diminishing in loss size; and (3) the cut in offer price when target shareholders are in gain is smaller than the increase in offer price when they are in loss. In fact, the only difference between Column (2) of Table 4 and Table 3 evidence is that the gain-related coefficients become statistically insignificant.

[Insert Table 4 about here]

Columns (3) and (4) incorporate both the IIAPP and the High price. The IIAPP behavior as a reference price resembles that of TAPP. This is not surprising given that both TAPP and IIAPP are estimators of target shareholders' purchase price. However, the explanatory power of IIAPP is much smaller than that of TAPP, as manifested by the lower p-values of its coefficients and the lower adjusted  $R^2$ s in the regressions of Columns (3) and (4).

Columns (5) and (6) examine combining the TAPP and IIAPP reference prices. Recall that both TAPP and IIAPP compete on representing target shareholders' stock purchase price, and given that each has deficiencies, our Hypothesis 3 proposes that both would contribute to the explanation of the offer premium. However, in practice, Columns (5) and (6) point out a clear winner: the coefficients of TAPP\_Prem are significant while the coefficients of IIAPP\_Prem lack any statistical significance. Evidently, TAPP dominates IIAPP as a reference price.

Last, Columns (7) and (8) attempt merger premium regressions with all three reference prices. In the presence of TAPP\_Prem and High\_Prem the coefficients of IIAPP\_Prem become statistically insignificant. Furthermore, in Columns (7) and (8) we attain the same adjusted  $R^2$ s as in Columns (1) and (2). Thus, in general, High\_price and TAPP adequately represent the target-shareholders-associated reference price effects on a merger offer price.

### 5.3. The Impact of Adding Bidder Attributes and Reference Prices

Since the merger offer premium is decided by the bidder, bidder characteristics, and behavioral biases might impact it as well. Bidder characteristics such as size, profitability, growth and leverage might shape a bidder's perspective and opportunity set and thus impact the offer premium. The bidder-related reference price effects also emerge. For example, Ma et al. (2019) documented that the premium offered in non-cash M&A deals is higher the closer the bidder's stock price is to its 52-week high. This phenomenon is routed in both bidder and target perspectives. When bidder stock pre-offer price is close to its 52-week high, the bidder's stock might be overvalued, thus target shareholders rationally demand a higher premium in deals involving payment in bidder shares. Likewise, when the bidder's stock is close to its 52-week high, bidder managers are more prone to hubristic behavior that can lead them to offer inflated premiums (Roll, 1986).

Table 5 summarizes regressions of offer premiums on deal-, target- and bidder-characteristics. Deal and target characteristics are as in Table 4, and bidder characteristics include: bidder size, leverage, ROA, sales growth, price-earnings ratio, market-to-book ratio, and merger experience (= number of previous merger offers). The premium of the bidder's 52-week high price relative to the bidder's stock price 21 days before the offer, possibly a behavioral effect, is also added as an explanatory variable. The sample size in Table 5 is about a quarter less than in Table 4 because of missing bidder information. All bidders are public firms, yet some are foreign and others are not covered by CRSP or Compustat (probably due to their small size).

[Insert Table 5 about here]

Column (1) replicates the non-piecewise regression with HIGH\_Prem and TAPP\_Prem. The results are almost identical to those documented in Column (1) of Table 4 for the larger sample

used there. Column (2) adds bidder characteristics and Column (3) presents the parsimonious form including bidder characteristics. It appears that experienced bidders slightly decrease their offer premium, perhaps in response to the negative bidder abnormal returns typically recorded around merger offer proposals. High leverage also lowers the offer premium, possibly because of creditor restrictions. In contrast, relatively large, profitable, and highly-valued bidder firms (that manifest relatively high total assets, ROA, and market-to-book ratios) tend to offer higher premiums, perhaps because such strong firms are able to extract larger synergy gains from the merger deal.

In Column (3) we also examine the effect of the *Bidder\_High\_Prem*, the premium of the bidder stock's 52-week high price over its pre-offer price. The coefficient of *Bidder\_High\_Prem* is negative and statistically significant. Consistent with Ma et al. (2019), when the bidder stock is close to its 52-week high just before the merger offer, the bidder's offer tends to be more generous.

Ma et al. (2019) also claimed this effect is cardinal in non-cash deals. Thus, in Column (4) regressions, we add an interaction term between cash deals and *Bidder\_High\_Prem* as an explanatory variable. The results are clear-cut. The coefficients of *Bidder\_High\_Prem* and its interaction with cash deals are opposite in sign, statistically significant, and almost equal in absolute value, implying that the extra premium offered when the bidder stock price is close to its 52-week high is limited to non-cash deals only. This suggests that when the bidder stock price is over-valued (or there is a suspicion that it is over-valued) and the bidder proposes to pay target shareholders with it, the bidder is willing (or target shareholders demand, respectively) a higher offer premium. The fact that for cash offers there is no effect of the ratio of the pre-offer bidder stock price to its 52-week high may also indicate that the documented effect of this bidder stock price ratio is not a result of bidder hubris. However, we do not argue and cannot rule out the proposition that the *Bidder\_High\_Prem* effect is related to or representative of a behavioral bias.

Column (5) presents the results of a piece-wise premium regression including the significant bidder-related variables. The results are similar to the comparable regression in Column (2) of Table 4, yet the explanatory power (adjusted-R<sup>2</sup>) improves substantially. Most importantly, our conclusions about the impact of the various reference prices remain intact.

#### **5.4. The Economic Impact of Losses Relative to Reference Prices**

Our most-developed empirical analysis, summarized in Column (5) of Table 5, can be used to examine the economic significance of the reference price effects, i.e., the extra premium offered when target shareholders are in a loss situation. The magnitude of the compensation for a loss of Y% relative to TAPP (52-week high) is assessed by multiplying the corresponding levels of the three Positive\_TAPP\_Prem\_X (HIGH\_Prem\_X) variables by their regression coefficients reported in Column (5). Recall that the specification of the three levels is incremental by design in order to capture the marginal effect in each of the three regions.

For example, suppose on the eve of the offer, target shareholders are in a loss of 10% relative to TAPP and 15% relative to the 52-week high. In this case: Positive\_TAPP\_Prem\_Small = 10%, Positive\_TAPP\_Prem\_Medium = 0, and Positive\_TAPP\_Prem\_Large = 0; HIGH\_Prem\_Small = 10%, HIGH\_Prem\_Medium = 5%, and HIGH\_Prem\_Large = 0. Given the coefficients in Column (5), the assessed increase in offer premium attributed to loss relative to TAPP is  $0.471 \times 10\% = 4.71\%$ , while the assessed increase in offer premium due to loss relative to the 52-week high is  $0.535 \times 10\% + 0.140 \times 5\% = 6.05\%$ . Thus, in our example, the total increase in offer premium due to losses relative to reference prices, 10.76%, is definitely economically significant.

Figure 2 plots the extra premium offered for various levels of losses relative to our two reference prices. Several observations are noteworthy. First, the compensation offered for a loss of Y% relative to TAPP (TAPP\_Prem line) is almost identical to the compensation offered for an equal loss relative to 52-week high (High\_Prem line). It appears that the bidder perceives both losses to be of equal importance for target shareholders, and offers an identical schedule of compensation for each of them.

[Insert Figure 2 about here]

Second, the extra premium exhibits diminishing marginal compensation for losses, consistently with our analysis of Table 3 and Table 4 results. However, Figure 2 illustrates the magnitude of the phenomenon. For example, for a loss of 10% relative to the 52-week high, the extra premium offered is 5.4%, while for a five-fold loss of 50% relative to the 52-week high, the extra premium offered is less than double, 9.2%. The higher marginal compensation for small losses is consistent with Prospect Theory and its S-shaped utility function of economic agents (target shareholders in our case). It might also indicate that there is a limit to the generosity of the bidder and her willingness to compensate target shareholders for their losses. Thus, it is possible that both sides of the deal are responsible for the diminishing marginal compensation phenomenon.

Third, it is interesting that the sum of the coefficients of Positive\_TAPP\_Prem\_Small, 0.471, and HIGH\_Prem\_Small, 0.535, is very close to 1. The implication is that if target shareholders' are in a 10% loss relative to our estimate of their purchase price (TAPP) and in a 10% loss relative to the 52-week high, they are offered an extra merger premium of about 10%. In such a case we can argue that they receive full compensation for their losses. In short, sometimes the bidder fully compensates target shareholders for small losses relative to their two pertinent reference prices purchase price and 52-week high.

Last, the magnitude of the extra premium offered in response to losses relative to the reference prices is nontrivial. If the mean merger offer premium is about 32% (see Table 2), an extra premium for perceived losses of 10% (like in the example above) constitutes a nontrivial fraction of it. In the next section we examine how important are reference prices in determining the merger offer acceptance likelihood.

## **6. Behavioral Effects on Offer Acceptance Likelihood**

Baker et al. (2012) proposed a methodology to test the effect of a reference price on merger offer “success” (= acceptance) likelihood (see their Table 7). We follow their specification of using as explanatory variables a quartic polynomial of the offer premium (to account for any possible effect of the offer premium on target shareholder accept/reject decisions) and a dummy variable in cases where the offer price exceeds the reference price (to measure the behavioral effect of a reference price). If a reference price is cardinal in target shareholders’ decisions, surpassing it creates a discontinuity or jump in offer acceptance likelihood. This possible upward jump is measured by the dummy variable coefficient in the above-suggested specification.

Table 6 presents the results of Probit analyses of offer acceptances that inquire about possible jump effects of our three reference prices. We employ a full suite of controls including deal controls, target- and bidder-firm controls, and industry- and fiscal year-fixed effects. Columns (1) and (2) report the benchmark Probit analysis without the presence of any reference prices. From Column (2), the parsimonious form of the Probit results, we can infer on some factors (apart from the offer premium) that affect offer acceptance likelihood. It appears that relatively large targets that demonstrate relatively high-sales growth rates reject merger offers more often. On the other hand, offers of large and highly valued bidders are more likely to be accepted. Thus, offer

acceptance likelihood appears to depend on the relative size and relative “success” of the bidder and target.

Deal characteristics also have a nontrivial impact on offer acceptance likelihood. Friendly offers are more likely to be accepted, while diversifying offers proposing to combine firms from different industries are less convincing and more often rejected. In addition, rivalry between several bidders for the firm naturally reduces any offer success likelihood.

[Insert Table 6 about here]

Column (3) adds Bidder\_High\_Prem, the premium of bidder stock’s 52-week high price over the bidder stock’s pre-offer level, as an explanatory variable. The Bidder\_High\_Prem effect on offer acceptance likelihood is negative and statistically significant. Consistent with Ma et al.’s (2019) evidence on offer success in public firms (see their Table 8, specifically the last set of tests), the closer the bidder pre-offer price is to its 52-week high price (i.e., the lower is our Bidder\_High\_Prem) the more likely an offer acceptance becomes. Perhaps when the bidder’s pre-offer price is close to its peak, public shareholders are somewhat enthusiastic about the bidder firm, and target shareholders are less inimical towards merging with it, increasing offer acceptance likelihood. It is noteworthy that when we add the interaction of a cash deal with Bidder\_High\_Prem to the Probit analysis, its coefficient is statistically insignificant. Thus, the effect of the bidder stock’s 52-week high is not limited to deals wherein consideration is offered in shares—i.e., the 52-week effect on offer acceptance likelihood is also present in cash deals in which bidder stock pricing is not a cardinal economic issue.

Columns (4)–(6) add dummy variables measuring the jump in acceptance likelihood when the offer price exceeds a certain reference price. In Column (4), the Dum\_High coefficient estimates the effect of the offer price exceeding the 52-week High price of target stock

(specifically, Dum\_High equals 1 when offer price  $\geq$  target's 52-week high price, and equals 0 otherwise). The coefficient of Dum\_High is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. Evidently, when the offer price exceeds the 52-week high price of the target stock, offer success likelihood increases significantly. Given the point estimate of the Dum\_High coefficient, we assess a 3.8% jump in acceptance probability when the offer price exceeds the target stock's 52-week high.

Column (5) adds Dum\_TAPP to the Column (3) Probit. The effect of offer price exceeding the TAPP on offer acceptance likelihood is positive and significant at the 10% level. However, this effect is modest relative to the effect of Dum\_High as previously documented. Similarly, in column (6), we examine the effect of IIAPP on offer acceptance likelihood and find the coefficient of Dum\_IIAPP to be positive and significant at the 10% level only. Apparently, the increase in offer acceptance likelihood upon surpassing a purchase price reference price (IIAPP or TAPP) is smaller than the jump in acceptance probability when the offer price exceeds target's 52-week high.

The impression that the effect of Dum\_High on offer acceptance likelihood is stronger than the effects of Dum\_TAPP and Dum\_IIAPP receives support from the Probit analysis of Column (7) where we toss together all three dummy variables. In Column (7) only the coefficient of Dum\_High is statistically significant. The coefficient of Dum\_TAPP is positive yet minute and statistically insignificant, and the coefficient of Dum\_IIAPP is very close zero. Furthermore, the Probit  $R^2$  in column (7) is identical to that of Column (4) in which we employ only Dum\_High. This finding suggests that only when offer price exceeds target's 52-week high we can reliably identify an upward jump in offer acceptance likelihood.

On reflection, the most important evidence in Table 6 may be the meagre improvement in explanatory power when we add the reference price effects. The Probit analysis Pseudo  $R^2$  increases from 0.372 in a model without any behavioral effects, summarized in Column (2), to 0.379 in a model with behavioral effects, summarized in Column (4). This improvement in explanatory power pales in comparison to the improvement of the explanatory power upon adding reference prices to our offer premium regression—please see Tables 3–5. Apparently, the reference price impact on offer premiums is much larger than their sway on offer acceptance likelihood.

To further investigate the impact of reference prices on offer acceptance likelihood, we test the predictive ability of the Probit model with reference price effects in Column (4) and compare it to the predictive ability of the Probit model without reference price effects in Column (2). We define the prediction of the model to be “accept offer” for a specific offer, if for that offer the Probit model estimates translate into an imputed (calculated) offer-success probability equal or greater than one-half. In essence, for each of the merger offers examined in Table 6 we generate an “accept” or “reject” prediction based on the non-behavioral Column (2) model and an “accept” or “reject” prediction based on the behavioral Column (4) model.

Table 7 compares the accept/reject predictions of these two models to the actual outcome of the merger offers—i.e., to whether the offer was eventually accepted. Panel A examines the Probit model without any reference prices. The model predicts the correct outcome in 3,129 out of 3,432 merger offers (91.17%). This high predictive ability is not surprising since the offer acceptance rate is 86.86% (2,981 out of 3,432 offers were accepted), hence a simple predictive model stating that a merger offer is always accepted would score a predictive ability of 86.86% in our test sample.

Panel B examines the predictive performance of the Probit model with reference prices. It predicts the correct outcome in 91.23% of the cases (3,131 out of the 3,432 offers in our test sample). The increase in predictive ability relative to the model without reference prices is minute. In fact, the added variables in the model that includes reference prices, change the predictions of the model without reference prices in only 4 cases—i.e., in about 0.1% of our test sample 3,432 offers. Furthermore, in one of these four cases, the change of prediction made it wrong.

The evidence in Tables 6 and 7—that behavioral reference prices have a negligible marginal effect on offer acceptance likelihood—does not imply that reference prices do not impact merger decisions. Recall that the Probit analysis of offer acceptance likelihood controls for the effect of the offer premium. Our evidence in Tables 3–5 shows that reference prices affect the offer premium significantly, and in a pattern that is consistent with prospect theory. Thus, the proper conclusion from our findings is that behavioral reference prices affect merger offers acceptance likelihood via their effect on the offer premium. Practically, once offer premium is adjusted to reference prices, no further behavioral effects need to be considered.

## **7. Summary and Conclusions**

We develop a new measure of shareholders stock purchase price, TAPP, and test its performance as a reference price in merger offers. In a large sample of all merger offers for U.S. public firms in 1990-2019, where the bidder firm is also public, we find that the ratio of TAPP to the pre-offer target stock price impacts the merger offer premium significantly. Consistent with prospect theory, our evidence suggests that the offer premium increases when target shareholders are in loss (relative to their purchase price) on the eve of the offer, and that the marginal compensation for a loss decreases with the loss size. Thus, our new measure appears to represent well the “mental accounting” considerations of target shareholders.

In further tests we show that our new measure complements the effect of another reference price—the target stock’s pre-offer 52-week high price (Baker et al., 2012). We show that both TAPP and the 52-week high significantly impact the merger offer premium. The premium adjustment for a loss relative to TAPP is about equal to the adjustment for a loss relative to the 52-week high, and in some cases the extra premium offered to target shareholders fully compensates them for their losses relative to these reference prices. Apparently, both loss aversion (TAPP) and regrets (52-week high) impact merger offer premiums. Interestingly, in our sample, TAPP dominates the effect of an alternative target shareholders’ purchase price estimate—the institutional investors’ average purchase price (Frazzini, 2006; and Ye, 2014). In the presence of TAPP, the institutional investors’ average purchase price does not contribute to the explanatory power.

We also add bidder characteristics and a bidder-related reference price—the premium of bidder stock pre-offer 52-week high price over its pre-offer price—as controls to our analysis. Consistent with Ma et al. (2019), we find that when the bidder stock price is close to its 52-week high on the eve of the offer, the offered premium increases, possibly indicating a bidder behavioral bias. Notably, in all the tests we run, the effect of our new reference price estimate, TAPP, on the offer premium, is highly significant. Thus, our first conclusion is that TAPP, built to estimate target shareholders’ purchase price, is a pertinent reference price for merger offers.

Our second major conclusion emanates from our analysis of merger-offer acceptance likelihood. When the offer premium is used as an explanatory variable in the Probit of offer acceptance likelihood, reference prices have a negligible impact on target shareholders’ decision to accept or reject an offer. This finding is confirmed by a simple test of predictive ability, comparing the number of correct predictions of models with and without reference prices. It

appears that behavioral reference prices impact merger offers primarily (or maybe even solely) via their effect on the merger premium. Once the premium is adjusted, any further behavioral effect is immaterial.

Future studies should further explore the qualities and performance of our new purchase price measure, TAPP, in other economic environments. Hopefully TAPP would contribute to the understanding of many other phenomena. Future research should also examine our novel proposition that in merger situations all reference price effects gravitate to the offer premium.

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**Table 1: Sample Descriptive Statistics**

The table describes our sample of 4,910 merger offers for U.S. public firms from 1990 to 2019. Target and bidder characteristics are computed using Compustat utilizing data for the fiscal year preceding the offer. Return on assets is income before extraordinary items (IB) divided by total assets (AT); sales growth rate is the rate of sales growth over the prior fiscal year; leverage is long-term debt total (DLTT) divided by total assets (AT); market-to-book ratio is market equity, computed by multiplying common shares outstanding and price at fiscal year-end (PRCC\_F\*CSHO), divided by common/ordinary shareholders' equity at fiscal year-end (CEQ); price-earnings ratio is the ratio of year-end stock price (PRCC\_F) to earnings per share for that year (EPSPX). All characteristics are winsorized at the 2.5% and 97.5% levels. The merger offer characteristics: form of payment (all-cash, all-stock), bidder attitude (friendly), existence of rival bids (offers with more than one bidder), diversifying offers (the bidder and target have different 2-digit Standard Industrial Classification codes), and deal completion indicator, are from the SDC file (Thomson Reuters).

	Number of observations	Mean or proportion	Median	Standard deviation
<b><i>Target firm characteristics</i></b>				
Total assets (in million dollars)	4,832	1,322.99	300.85	2,805.74
Sales growth rate	4,713	0.1996	0.0995	0.4210
Return on assets	4,832	-0.0289	0.0121	0.1728
Debt divided by total assets	4,803	0.1565	0.0788	0.1826
Market-to-book ratio of the stock	4,808	2.4993	1.7302	2.3795
Price-earnings ratio of the stock	4,814	11.13	12.50	31.86
<b><i>Bidder firm characteristics</i></b>				
Total assets (in million dollars)	3,816	12,761.28	2,432.28	26,488.70
Sales growth rate	3,739	0.2498	0.1285	0.4408
Return on assets	3,811	0.0283	0.0313	0.0917
Debt divided by total assets	3,798	0.1615	0.1137	0.1601
Market-to-book ratio of the stock	3,755	3.4064	2.3145	3.0745
Price-earnings ratio of the stock	3,747	19.1018	16.7079	32.2015
Bidder experience (number of previous bids)	4,303	1.46	0	2.75
<b><i>Merger offer characteristics</i></b>				
Proportion of completed deals	4,910	0.8668		
Proportion of diversifying offers	4,910	0.3275		
Proportion of rival bids	4,910	0.0725		
Proportion of "all cash" offers	4,910	0.3613		
Proportion of "all stock" offers	4,910	0.3452		
Proportion of "friendly" offers	4,910	0.9385		

**Table 2: Various Price Ratios on the Eve of Merger Offer**

This table documents the mean of some potentially relevant price ratios on the eve of merger offers, including a partition by deal completion. The sample includes 4,910 merger offers for U.S. public firms from 1990 to 2019. TAPP is the target average purchase price, IIAPP is the institutional investors' average purchase price (more details in the text), and the price on day A-21 is the price 21 trading days (about a month) before the offer announcement. Winsorizing is performed on each of the ratios at the 2.5% and 97.5% levels. The last column reports the difference in the mean price ratio between completed and failed deals, as well as its statistical significance (derived from a two-sided t-test of mean differences). \*\*\*, \*\*, and \* indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.

Price ratio	Number of observations	Mean for all offers	Mean for completed deals	Mean for failed offers	Difference in means between completed and failed offers
Ln (offer price / target stock price on day A-21)	4,910	0.316	0.318	0.302	0.016
Ln (TAPP / target stock price on day A-21)	4,910	0.052	0.040	0.126	-0.086***
Ln (target's pre-offer 52-week high price / target stock price on day A-21).	4,910	0.338	0.329	0.401	-0.072***
Ln (target's IIAPP / target stock price on day A-21)	4,795	0.084	0.070	0.179	-0.109***
Ln (bidder's pre-offer 52-week high price / bidder's stock price on day A-21)	4,130	0.194	0.185	0.257	-0.072***

### Table 3: Reference Price Effects on the Merger Offer Premium

The table reports results of OLS regressions seeking to explain the merger offer premiums (Offer\_Prem). The offer premium is defined as  $\text{Ln}(\text{offer price}/\text{stock price A-21})$  in which stock price A-21 is the target stock price 21 trading days (about a month) before the offer announcement date. Regarding reference price-explanatory variables, HIGH\_Prem measures the impact of the 52-week-high price, and is defined as  $\text{Ln}(\text{the pre-offer, 52-week-high price}/\text{stock price A-21})$ ; TAPP\_Prem measures the impact of TAPP (target shareholders average purchase price) and is defined as  $\text{Ln}(\text{TAPP}/\text{stock price A-21})$ ; and IIAPP\_Prem measures the impact of IIAPP (institutional investors' average purchase price) and is defined as  $\text{Ln}(\text{IIAPP}/\text{stock price A-21})$ . Columns (4), (6) and (8) report the results of piecewise regressions estimating the marginal effects of the size of the reference price premium. For example, TAPP\_Prem is divided into three loss regions: small, medium, and large losses on the offer eve (relative to TAPP) and three gain regions with a separate marginal coefficient estimated for each of these six regions. (More details in the text.)

All merger deal characteristics are from the SDC: Friendly is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the deal attitude is friendly and equal to 0 if not; All\_Cash is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the deal consideration structure is cash only and equal to 0 if not; All\_Stock is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the deal consideration structure is shares only and equal to 0 if not; Diversified is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the bidder and target are from different industries (as defined by their 2-digit Standard Industrial Classification codes) and equal to 0 if not; Rival\_Bid is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a target has more than one bidder at the time of the offer and equal to 0 if not. Target firm characteristics employed as explanatory variables include: Target\_Size is the natural logarithm of the firm's total assets (in millions of U.S. dollars) at the end of the fiscal year preceding the offer; Sales\_Growth is the rate of sales growth over the prior fiscal year; DA is the ratio of long-term debt to total assets at the end of the fiscal year preceding the offer; ROA is a ratio of income before extraordinary items to total assets at the end of the fiscal year preceding the offer; MB is the ratio of year-end market value of common stock to the book value of equity for the prior fiscal year; PE is the ratio of year-end stock price to earnings per share for the prior fiscal year. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 2.5% and 97.5% levels, and all specifications include calendar year and industry fixed effects (using the Fama-French 48 industry classification). Robust standard errors, clustered at the target firm level, are in parentheses. \*, \*\* and \*\*\* denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

**Table 3 (cont.)**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Friendly	-0.0172 (0.0135)	-0.0224* (0.0128)	-0.0217* (0.0123)	-0.0179 (0.0121)	-0.0223* (0.0122)	-0.0198 (0.0122)	-0.0214* (0.0125)	-0.0183 (0.0125)
All_Cash	0.0386*** (0.00854)	0.0375*** (0.00839)	0.0427*** (0.00810)	0.0424*** (0.00803)	0.0409*** (0.00813)	0.0409*** (0.00809)	0.0434*** (0.00826)	0.0430*** (0.00821)
All_Stock	-0.0309*** (0.00886)	-0.0334*** (0.00872)	-0.0384*** (0.00858)	-0.0377*** (0.00852)	-0.0440*** (0.00857)	-0.0436*** (0.00851)	-0.0379*** (0.00863)	-0.0374*** (0.00862)
Diversified	0.00567 (0.00755)							
Rival_Bid	0.00345 (0.0150)							
Sales_Growth	-0.00656 (0.00982)							
DA	0.0295 (0.0233)							
ROA	-0.0111 (0.0298)							
MB	-0.00397** (0.00171)	-0.00357** (0.00161)	-0.0000674 (0.00158)					
PE	-0.000129 (0.000109)							
Target_Size	-0.0160*** (0.00236)	-0.0163*** (0.00226)	-0.00950*** (0.00220)	-0.00998*** (0.00224)	-0.0108*** (0.00223)	-0.00997*** (0.00222)	-0.0103*** (0.00230)	-0.0104*** (0.00231)
TAPP_Prem			0.142*** (0.0125)					
Positive_TAPP_Prem_Large				0.0403 (0.0346)				
Positive_TAPP_Prem_Medium				0.138* (0.0737)				
Positive_TAPP_Prem_Small				0.416*** (0.119)				
Negative_TAPP_Prem_Small				0.246** (0.117)				
Negative_TAPP_Prem_Medium				0.235** (0.0995)				
Negative_TAPP_Prem_Large				0.0811 (0.0531)				
HIGH_Prem					0.128*** (0.0125)			
HIGH_Prem_Large						0.0611*** (0.0196)		
HIGH_Prem_Medium						0.271*** (0.0439)		
HIGH_Prem_Small						0.642*** (0.0985)		
IIAPP_Prem							0.0841*** (0.0088)	
Positive_IIAPP_Prem_Large								0.0272 (0.0229)
Positive_IIAPP_Prem_Medium								0.0684 (0.0514)
Positive_IIAPP_Prem_Small								0.344*** (0.0994)
Negative_IIAPP_Prem_Small								0.148 (0.0904)
Negative_IIAPP_Prem_Medium								0.110* (0.0620)
Negative_IIAPP_Prem_Large								0.0384 (0.0382)
Industry and year fixed effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	4647	4808	4808	4832	4832	4832	4729	4729
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.096	0.096	0.137	0.146	0.130	0.143	0.129	0.136

#### **Table 4: The Combined Effect of Reference Prices on the Merger Offer Premium**

The table reports the results of OLS regressions seeking to explain the merger offer premiums (Offer\_Prem) and employs various combinations of reference prices. Offer premium is defined as  $\text{Ln}(\text{offer price}/\text{stock price A-21})$  in which stock price A-21 is target stock price 21 trading days (about a month) before the offer announcement date. Regarding reference price explanatory variables, HIGH\_Prem measures the impact of the 52-week high price, and is defined as  $\text{Ln}(\text{the pre-offer 52-week-high price}/\text{stock price A-21})$ ; TAPP\_Prem measures the impact of TAPP (target shareholders average purchase price), and is defined as  $\text{Ln}(\text{TAPP}/\text{stock price A-21})$ , and IIAPP\_Prem measures the impact of IIAPP (institutional investors' average purchase price) and defined as  $\text{Ln}(\text{IIAPP}/\text{stock price A-21})$ . Columns (2), (4), (6) and (8) report the results of piecewise regressions estimating the marginal effect of the size of each reference price premium. For example, TAPP\_Prem is divided into three loss regions: small, medium, and large losses on the offer eve (relative to TAPP) and three gain regions with a separate marginal coefficient estimated for each of these six regions. (More details in the text.).

Unreported deal and firm controls include Friendly (a dummy variable equal to 1 if the deal attitude is friendly and equal to 0 if not); All\_Cash (a dummy variable equal to 1 if the deal consideration structure is cash only and equal to 0 if not); All\_Stock (a dummy variable equal to 1 if the deal consideration structure is shares only and equal to 0 if not); and Target\_Size (the natural logarithm of the firm's total assets (at the end of the fiscal year preceding the offer)). All continuous variables are winsorized at the 2.5% and 97.5% levels, and all specifications include calendar year and industry fixed effects (using the Fama-French 48 industry classification). Robust standard errors, clustered at the target firm level, are in parentheses. \*, \*\* and \*\*\* denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

**Table 4 (cont.)**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
TAPP_Prem	0.108*** (0.0179)				0.127*** (0.0187)		0.105*** (0.0203)	
Positive_TAPP_Prem_Large		0.0345 (0.0381)				0.0463 (0.0448)		0.0422 (0.0450)
Positive_TAPP_Prem_Medium		0.140* (0.0768)				0.140* (0.0838)		0.142* (0.0848)
Positive_TAPP_Prem_Small		0.338*** (0.126)				0.345*** (0.124)		0.298** (0.128)
Negative_TAPP_Prem_Small		0.0877 (0.121)				0.202 (0.124)		0.0633 (0.125)
Negative_TAPP_Prem_Medium		0.0645 (0.103)				0.192* (0.104)		0.0542 (0.106)
Negative_TAPP_Prem_Large		0.0742 (0.0538)				0.0626 (0.0571)		0.0560 (0.0565)
HIGH_Prem	0.0478*** (0.0178)		0.0880*** (0.0177)				0.0457** (0.0192)	
HIGH_Prem_Large		0.00792 (0.0246)		0.0333 (0.0261)				0.00895 (0.0270)
HIGH_Prem_Medium		0.109** (0.0521)		0.193*** (0.0492)				0.0957* (0.0534)
HIGH_Prem_Small		0.537*** (0.110)		0.573*** (0.104)				0.534*** (0.111)
IIAPP_Prem			0.0394*** (0.0122)		0.0157 (0.0129)		0.00434 (0.0138)	
Positive_IIAPP_Prem_Large				0.0107 (0.0259)		-0.00338 (0.0290)		-0.00486 (0.0304)
Positive_IIAPP_Prem_Medium				0.0286 (0.0532)		-0.0204 (0.0575)		-0.0287 (0.0580)
Positive_IIAPP_Prem_Small				0.219** (0.102)		0.156 (0.105)		0.134 (0.106)
Negative_IIAPP_Prem_Small				-0.00405 (0.0907)		0.00946 (0.0927)		-0.0257 (0.0926)
Negative_IIAPP_Prem_Medium				0.0417 (0.0617)		0.0325 (0.0634)		0.0177 (0.0631)
Negative_IIAPP_Prem_Large				0.0388 (0.0377)		0.0251 (0.0390)		0.0288 (0.0388)
Deal and firm explanatory variables	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Industry and calendar fixed effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	4729	4729	4729	4729	4729	4729	4729	4729
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.144	0.155	0.137	0.150	0.142	0.150	0.144	0.155

**Table 5: Adding Bidder Characteristics to the Merger Offer Premium Analysis**

The table reports the results of OLS regressions seeking to explain the merger offer premiums (Offer\_Prem), employing reference prices and an expanded set of controls. Offer premium is defined as  $\text{Ln}(\text{offer price}/\text{stock price A-21})$ , where stock price A-21 is target stock price 21 trading days (about a month) before offer announcement date. Regarding reference price explanatory variables, HIGH\_Prem measures the impact of the 52-week high price, and is defined as  $\text{Ln}(\text{the pre-offer 52-week-high price}/\text{stock price A-21})$ ; and TAPP\_Prem measures the impact of TAPP (target shareholders average purchase price), and is defined as  $\text{Ln}(\text{TAPP}/\text{stock price A-21})$ . The sample size shrinks by about a quarter relative to the analysis in Table 4 because of missing bidder information. (All bidders are public, yet some of them are foreign and some are not covered by CRSP or Compustat.) Column (5) report the results of piecewise regressions estimating the marginal effect of the size of the reference price premiums. For example, TAPP\_Prem is divided into three loss regions: small, medium, and large losses on the offer eve (relative to TAPP) and three gain regions with a separate marginal coefficient estimated for each of these six regions. (More details in the text.)

Deal controls include: Friendly (a dummy variable equal to 1 if the deal attitude is friendly and equal to 0 if not); All\_Cash (a dummy variable equal to 1 if the deal consideration structure is cash only and equal to 0 if not); All\_Stock (a dummy variable equal to 1 if the deal consideration structure is shares only and equal to 0 if not. Based on Table 4 evidence, target firm controls include only Target\_Size (the natural logarithm of the target firm's total assets (at the end of the fiscal year preceding the offer)). Bidder controls include: Bidder\_experience is bidder's number of previous mergers; Bidder ROA is a ratio of the bidder's income before extraordinary items to bidder's total assets at the end of the fiscal year preceding the offer; Bidder sales growth is the bidder's rate of sales growth over the prior fiscal year; Bidder DA is the bidder's ratio of long-term debt to total assets at the end of the fiscal year preceding the offer; Bidder MB is the ratio of bidder's year-end market value of common stock to the bidder's book value of equity in the prior fiscal year; Bidder PE is the ratio of year-end bidder's stock price to bidder's earnings per share for the prior fiscal year; Bidder size is the natural logarithm of the bidder firm's total assets at the end of the fiscal year preceding the offer; Bidder High\_Prem is  $\text{Ln}(\text{bidder's stock pre-offer 52-week high price}/\text{bidder's stock price A-21})$ ; Bidder\_High\_Prem\_Cash is an interaction term between cash deals and Bidder\_High\_Prem. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 2.5% and 97.5% levels, and all specifications include calendar year and industry fixed effects (using the Fama-French 48 industry classification). Robust standard errors, clustered at the target firm level, are in parentheses. \*, \*\* and \*\*\* denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Friendly	-0.0203 (0.0143)	-0.0399*** (0.0142)	-0.0416*** (0.0142)	-0.0405*** (0.0143)	-0.0389*** (0.0142)
All_Cash	0.0466*** (0.00938)	0.0183* (0.00975)	0.0172* (0.00970)	-0.00691 (0.0116)	-0.00629 (0.0115)
All_Stock	-0.0405*** (0.00947)	-0.0394*** (0.00935)	-0.0411*** (0.00935)	-0.0403*** (0.00935)	-0.0407*** (0.00933)
Target size	-0.00822*** (0.00257)	-0.0205*** (0.00312)	-0.0214*** (0.00312)	-0.0218*** (0.00312)	-0.0204*** (0.00319)

**Table 5 (cont.)**

Bidder_experience		-0.00206*	-0.00215*	-0.00219*	-0.00255**
		(0.00123)	(0.00123)	(0.00123)	(0.00122)
Bidder ROA		0.185***	0.170***	0.153**	0.120**
		(0.0622)	(0.0604)	(0.0609)	(0.0614)
Bidder sales growth		-0.00150			
		(0.0101)			
Bidder DA		-0.0539**	-0.0598**	-0.0600**	-0.0712***
		(0.0270)	(0.0270)	(0.0270)	(0.0271)
Bidder MB		0.00477***	0.00510***	0.00527***	0.00508***
		(0.00148)	(0.00146)	(0.00146)	(0.00146)
Bidder PE		0.0000145			
		(0.000133)			
Bidder size		0.0174***	0.0177***	0.0180***	0.0185***
		(0.00287)	(0.00284)	(0.00283)	(0.00283)
Bidder High_Prem		-0.101***	-0.104***	-0.140***	-0.146***
		(0.0244)	(0.0244)	(0.0288)	(0.0287)
Bidder_High_Prem_Cash				0.127***	0.125***
				(0.0438)	(0.0437)
TAPP_Prem	0.104***	0.134***	0.137***	0.135***	
	(0.0204)	(0.0202)	(0.0202)	(0.0203)	
HIGH_Prem	0.0500**	0.0700***	0.0660***	0.0695***	
	(0.0203)	(0.0204)	(0.0207)	(0.0208)	
HIGH_Prem_Large					0.0220
					(0.0284)
HIGH_Prem_Medium					0.140**
					(0.0593)
HIGH_Prem_Small					0.535***
					(0.122)
Positive_TAPP_Prem_Large					0.0779*
					(0.0424)
Positive_TAPP_Prem_Medium					0.156*
					(0.0882)
Positive_TAPP_Prem_Small					0.471***
					(0.140)
Negative_TAPP_Prem_Small					0.00825
					(0.136)
Negative_TAPP_Prem_Medium					0.0877
					(0.114)
Negative_TAPP_Prem_Large					0.0604
					(0.0570)
Industry and year fixed effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	3547	3547	3587	3587	3587
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.147	0.181	0.180	0.182	0.192

## Table 6: The Effect of Reference Prices on the Offer Acceptance Likelihood

The table reports results of the Probit analyses. The dependent variable equals 1 if the merger is completed and 0 otherwise. The independent variables include: a quartic polynomial of the offer premium over the target stock price 21 days before the announcement day; Dum\_High is a dummy variable equal to 1 if offer price  $\geq$  the target highest price in the period from day -21 to day -250 preceding the offer (equals 0 otherwise); Dum\_TAPP is a dummy variable based on our estimate of target shareholders average purchase price, and it equals 1 if offer price  $\geq$  TAPP (equals 0 otherwise); Dum\_IIAPP is a dummy variable based on our estimate of institutional investors' average purchase price, and it equals 1 if offer price  $\geq$  IIAPP (equals 0 otherwise). Deal controls include: Friendly is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the deal attitude is friendly and equal to 0 if not; All\_Cash is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the deal consideration structure is cash only and equal to 0 if not; All\_Stock is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the deal consideration structure is shares only and equal to 0 if not; Diversified is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the bidder and target are from different industries (as defined by their 2-digit Standard Industrial Classification codes) and equal to 0 if not; Rival\_Bid is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the target has more than one bidder at the time of the offer and equal to 0 if not. Target firm characteristics are also employed as explanatory variables: Target\_Size is the natural logarithm of the firm's total assets (in millions of U.S. dollars) at the end of the fiscal year preceding the offer; Sales\_Growth is the rate of sales growth over the prior fiscal year; DA is the ratio of long-term debt to total assets at the end of the fiscal year preceding the offer; ROA is a ratio of income before extraordinary items to total assets at the end of the fiscal year preceding the offer; MB is the ratio of year-end market value of common stock to the book value of equity for the prior fiscal year; and PE is the ratio of year-end stock price to earnings per share in the prior fiscal year. Bidder controls include: Bidder\_experience is the number of bidder previous mergers; Bidder ROA is a ratio of the bidder's income before extraordinary items to the bidder's total assets at the end of the fiscal year preceding the offer; Bidder sales growth is the bidder's rate of sales growth over the prior fiscal year; Bidder DA is the bidder's ratio of long-term debt to total assets at the end of the fiscal year preceding the offer; Bidder MB is the ratio of the bidder's year-end market value of common stock to the bidder's book value of equity for the prior fiscal year; Bidder PE is the ratio of the year-end bidder's stock price to bidder's earnings per share for the prior fiscal year; Bidder size is the natural logarithm of the bidder firm's total assets at the end of the fiscal year preceding the offer; Bidder High\_Prem is  $\ln(\text{bidder's stock pre-offer 52-week high price/bidder's stock price A-21})$ . All continuous variables are winsorized at the 2.5% and 97.5% levels, and all specifications include calendar year and industry fixed effects (using the Fama-French 48 industry classification). Robust standard errors, clustered at the target firm level, are in parentheses. \*, \*\* and \*\*\* denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

**Table 6 (cont.)**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Offer_Prem	0.335* (0.194)	0.413** (0.181)	0.363** (0.183)	0.153 (0.189)	0.237 (0.194)	0.273 (0.191)	0.125 (0.196)
Offer_Prem <sup>2</sup>	-0.145 (0.264)	-0.0533 (0.256)	0.0138 (0.259)	0.0574 (0.260)	0.0946 (0.262)	0.0595 (0.261)	0.0807 (0.264)
Offer_Prem <sup>3</sup>	-0.107 (0.0950)	-0.126 (0.0932)	-0.121 (0.0928)	-0.0604 (0.0901)	-0.0886 (0.0912)	-0.0935 (0.0926)	-0.0540 (0.0906)
Offer_Prem <sup>4</sup>	0.0184 (0.0844)	-0.00946 (0.0815)	-0.0220 (0.0815)	-0.0420 (0.0794)	-0.0455 (0.0804)	-0.0341 (0.0810)	-0.0482 (0.0797)
Friendly	2.338*** (0.132)	2.239*** (0.130)	2.244*** (0.130)	2.272*** (0.132)	2.259*** (0.130)	2.253*** (0.130)	2.276*** (0.131)
All_Cash	0.112 (0.0999)						
All_Stock	-0.127 (0.0852)						
Diversified	-0.149* (0.0774)	-0.171** (0.0748)	-0.171** (0.0748)	-0.169** (0.0751)	-0.173** (0.0749)	-0.169** (0.0749)	-0.169** (0.0752)
Rival_Bid	-1.281*** (0.106)	-1.227*** (0.101)	-1.232*** (0.101)	-1.246*** (0.102)	-1.240*** (0.101)	-1.235*** (0.101)	-1.248*** (0.101)
Sales_Growth	-0.213*** (0.0814)	-0.231*** (0.0780)	-0.212*** (0.0782)	-0.194** (0.0783)	-0.207*** (0.0778)	-0.212*** (0.0779)	-0.194** (0.0782)
DA	0.00132 (0.245)						
ROA	0.0131 (0.256)						
MB	-0.0200 (0.0155)						
PE	0.000726 (0.00110)						
Target_sSize	-0.102*** (0.0320)	-0.107*** (0.0293)	-0.110*** (0.0293)	-0.112*** (0.0291)	-0.111*** (0.0293)	-0.112*** (0.0293)	-0.112*** (0.0291)
Bidder_experience	-0.00762 (0.0218)						
Bidder ROA	0.0592 (0.432)						
Bidder sales growth	-0.0505 (0.0840)						
Bidder DA	-0.351 (0.253)						
Bidder MB	0.0410*** (0.0148)	0.0278** (0.0131)	0.0272** (0.0130)	0.0271** (0.0129)	0.0260** (0.0129)	0.0257** (0.0129)	0.0267** (0.0129)
Bidder PE	-0.00172 (0.00106)						
Bidder size	0.211*** (0.0289)	0.222*** (0.0241)	0.210*** (0.0242)	0.204*** (0.0240)	0.205*** (0.0242)	0.205*** (0.0243)	0.203*** (0.0241)
Bidder High_Prem			-0.379*** (0.144)	-0.228 (0.149)	-0.295** (0.149)	-0.308** (0.147)	-0.210 (0.151)
Dum_High				0.289*** (0.0791)			0.273*** (0.0877)
Dum_TAPP					0.179* (0.0954)		0.0609 (0.121)
Dum_IIAPP						0.147* (0.0872)	-0.00460 (0.115)
Industry and year FE	YES						
Observations	3339	3432	3432	3432	3432	3432	3432
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.378	0.372	0.374	0.379	0.375	0.375	0.379

**Table 7: Reference Price Contribution to Predicting an Offer Acceptance**

The table summarizes the predictive accuracy of two key models of offer acceptance likelihood. Panel A presents results of a model without reference prices (see Column 2 of Table 6) while Panel B is based on a model that includes significant reference prices (Column 4 of Table 6).

Panel A


Offer acceptance predictive accuracy without reference prices

		Model prediction		
		Accept offer	Reject offer	Total number
Actual outcome	Offer accepted	2930	51	2981
	Offer rejected	252	199	451
	Total number	3182	250	3432


Panel B

Offer acceptance predictive accuracy with reference prices

		Model prediction		
		Accept offer	Reject offer	Total number
Actual outcome	Offer accepted	2933	48	2981
	Offer rejected	253	198	451
	Total number	3186	246	3432



**Figure 1: Yearly Distribution of Merger Offers in our Sample**



**Figure 2: The Extra Premium in Loss Situations**

The figure is based on the piecewise offer premium regression presented in Table 5 Column (5). We compute, and show in the figure, the extra premium offered to target shareholders when they are in a loss situation, as a function of the loss magnitude. The TAPP\_Prem line represents the compensation offered to target shareholders' for their loss relative to our estimate of their average purchase price (TAPP), while the High\_Prem line represents compensation for the loss relative to the pre-offer 52-week high price of the target stock (more details in Table 5 and the text). The total compensation for losses relative to reference prices is the sum of the appropriate compensation for each of the losses. The cutoff losses between the three segments of the TAPP\_Prem (High\_Prem) line is 12.1% and 36.6% (10% and 34.9%, respectively).