סמינר במימון

Speaker:       Sivan Frenkel (Ph.D. candidate)

Abstract

I analyze a dynamic model of a public firm in which a transaction of an asset sale conveys information about the fim's value. The information release affcts a manager whose compensation is sensitive to the stock price. The model is based on having, in every period, a potential buyer that, with some probability, engages in symmetric information bargaining with the manager. I examine how the information externality affects the timing of the transaction, the prices at which these assets are sold, and the pattern of stock prices before and after the sale. I then analyze how the division of bargaining power between the buyer and the seller affects the above. I then consider the case in which the firm sells only some of its assets, and therefore a transaction affects the market perception of the value of the remaining assets.

The Article can be downloaded from the Finance-Accounting seminar website:

http://recanati-bs.tau.ac.il/Eng/Finance-Accounting-Seminar